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How is it possible for two or more individuals to share emotions? More specifi-
cally, how is it possible to share emotional episodes such that the participating 
individuals’ “feeling together” is not merely a matter of feeling the same emotion 
towards the same object or event alongside each other? What account of emotion 
and collectivity do we have to presuppose to allow for such a strong, non-meta-
phorical sense of affective sharing? And is there some specific, i.e. not so much 
psychological or onto- or phylogenetically developed, but rather genuinely exis-
tential ability built into our very social fabric, our being-together with others, 
that makes us capable to actualize such episodes of feeling-together? In Feeling 
Together and Caring with One Another Sánchez Guerrero sets out to address these 
questions head-on.
In the past few years, there has been a rapidly growing interest among soci-
ologists, social psychologists, political scientists and philosophers to account 
for such diverse affective phenomena as emotional contagion, affective entrain-
ment, collective effervescence, intergroup or group-based emotions, or political 
emotions, sometimes subsumed under the heading of “collective emotions.” But 
Sánchez Guerrero’s study is not only the first monographic philosophical study 
on the topic; moreover, and even in the face of the increasing philosophical 
sophistication in accounting for the nature of collective emotions, it represents 
the most sustained and thorough, and I wish to add, one of the most convinc-
ing accounts. In subtle and intricate, at times technical and difficult but always 
fully transparent and clearly motivated argumentative moves, it masterly steers 
a middle way between the Scylla of all-too loosely-knit emotional alignment and 
the Charybdis, or the “spectre,” of an emergent, supra-individual or any sort of 
robust group “emoter.”
The conceptual framework of the book builds upon the recent, so far pre-
dominantly analytic debates on collective intentionality (and esp. on the work of 
Margaret Gilbert, John Searle and Michael Bratman), and the rich body of work 
in, again broadly analytic, philosophy of emotions (esp. Peter Goldie, Robert 
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Roberts and Bennett Helm). At the same time, the account is firmly embedded 
in the phenomenological tradition, critically and thoroughly engaging with both 
classical (esp. Max Scheler and Gerda Walther) and contemporary phenomeno-
logical thinking about affective sharing, and ultimately endorses a distinctively 
Heideggerian perspective. This indeed seemingly effortless bridging the much-
cited analytic/continental-divide evidenced in the book is not only a generally 
laudable project but particularly commendable given the enormous conceptual 
resources in both traditions for accounting for the phenomenon at issue.
As the subtitle already indicates, the author defends the affective-intention-
ality account of emotions. This is arguably not only the most plausible contem-
porary account of emotions, which also becomes clear from Sánchez Guerrero’s 
well-informed critical discussion of competing historical and contemporary theo-
ries of emotions, notably Jamesian or Neo-Jamesian so-called “feeling theories,” 
on the one hand, and cognitivist accounts, on the other (Chapter 2). Moreover, this 
conception is most akin to early and contemporary phenomenological accounts 
of the intentionality of emotions (e.g. Scheler’s or Hans Bernhard Schmid’s), 
and particularly suited for applying it to collective emotions. This conception 
was first introduced by Goldie, who stresses both the affective and intentional, 
world-directed feature of emotions and characterizes them as “feeling-towards.” 
The basic idea underlying Sánchez Guerrero’s slightly adapted version is that 
emotions are “evaluative responses to particular situations” (p. 32ff.), situations 
that are “feelingly” (and not just cognitively) understood as “meriting a certain 
response.” Importantly, this notion of affective response, most systematically 
developed by Bennett Helm, is an essentially normative notion. Our emotions, 
qua responses to situations that merit specific evaluations, can respond to such 
affective “call” or “pull” either appropriately or inappropriately. Accordingly, our 
emotions can be warranted or unwarranted (p. 40ff.). Below, I will come back to 
this issue of normativity.
Bringing this notion of affective intentionality directly to bear on collective 
emotions, and accommodating both the affective and intentional dimension of 
emotions, the central claim of the study is that “collective affective intentionality 
is a matter of joint actualizations of our human faculty to feel-towards together” 
(p. 98). More specifically, and in terms of a cognitively undemanding sense of 
“felt understanding,” episodes of collective affective intentionality (CAI) neces-
sarily involve a “common,” “pre-thematic” background or understanding of the 
participating individuals, who “see themselves as standing in a particular rela-
tion to one another” (p. 95), and in particular, as affectively responding together 
to the given affective demands of the world (p. 102). Sánchez Guerrero aims, and 
indeed succeeds, to account for the phenomenological character of this under-
standing, which, minimally, entails that the participants not just understand 
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but precisely feelingly understand, or experience, actual instances of this shar-
edness. Notice, however, that he explicitly rejects the idea that we find, e.g. in 
Schmid’s otherwise congenial account (cf. Chapter 4), that the intentional act of 
individuals’ jointly actualizing their capacity to feel-towards would amount to an 
“experiential state,” that is realized as one single (token-identical) state across 
those individuals. Yet, in order to account for a robust sense of sharedness, some-
thing must in fact be integrated into a “single fact;” but this is not any mental 
or psychological state, but the joint actualization of the felt understanding and 
eventually the joint affective response (p. 118).
At this stage of the argument, two central questions arise: First, what inten-
tional component exactly in a shared evaluative response is it that guarantees 
such a robust integration into a single fact? Is it, as it seems most naturally to 
assume, the sharedness or identity of the evaluative target, i.e. the object that the 
respective emotions are (“feelingly”) directed at? Secondly, and relatedly, what 
kinds of groups are capable of such integration, or how should we conceive of 
collectives instantiating such joint affective response? Put differently, does strong 
affective integration result in some “phenomenological fusion” of the participat-
ing individuals (à la Schmid), or do we even have to presuppose some robust 
supra-individual group “emoter,” or a “plural subject” (à la Gilbert) for the consti-
tution of what Sánchez Guerrero calls “affective intentional communities”?
The strength of the argument of the present book lies in the critical stance 
to such strategies, while still accounting for a strong notion of affective integra-
tion. Sánchez Guerrero rejects both the view that CAI entails a token-identical 
emotional experience and that in CAI participants must share the same type 
of emotion. Participants’ emotions need not necessarily phenomenologically 
“match.” But what is more, they need not even be of the same type. According to 
the account of emotions that Sánchez Guerrero defends, (types of) emotions are 
individuated by their focus, i.e. the determinate property of the intentional object 
that a given emotion discloses as affectively significant for the subject and ulti-
mately warrants the emotion. The focus and the object or target of emotions need 
not coincide. My worry that you put a dent into the chrome-frame of my vintage 
bike by making an accident, and my furious anger at the bicycle-handicraftsman, 
who, by utterly careless handling, did damage the frame, have different objects 
and are different types of emotions (viz. worry regarding your inexperienced 
riding skills, anger with the experienced handicraftsman’s carelessness). But my 
emotional focus is identical here (the import that the flawlessness of my chrome-
frame has for me). Now, probably the boldest claim of the book is that neither 
the object nor even the focus need to coincide across participants in CAI. They 
can very well engage in CAI, even though one participant, say the conductor of 
an orchestra, feels a strong (collective) pride at the successful opening concert, 
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while the first violinist only feels a mild (collective) satisfaction and the oboist 
ravishes in collective joy (cf. p. 120ff.).
Just what is it then that constitutes the shared evaluative perspective of the 
affective community in such cases? Sánchez Guerrero’s reply is that rather than 
the specific affective response to a specific affective target across participants – 
i.e. rather than the shared emotional focus – it is “the fact that we […] already 
take ourselves to, together with the relevant others, constitute some group when 
we emotionally respond to a particular occurrence” (p. 12). But ultimately this 
is precisely not due to the convergence of the focus that picks out the particular 
occurrence as an occurrence of a shared concern, but “to the capacity to under-
stand one’s emotional response as a constitutive part of our response” (ibid.). 
One’s particular emotional response thus needs neither phenomenologically 
(e.g. in its intensity, duration, experiential qualities, whatever these may exactly 
be) nor intentionally (viz. in its specific intentional focus) converge with those of 
others in order to be integrated into an – affectively and intentionally unified – 
community. All that is needed is one’s felt understanding of having actualized an 
emotional response that is not just my but part of our response. Put somewhat dif-
ferently, it is sufficient that the participants’ individual simultaneous emotional 
responses of different emotional types are such that they are feeling together that 
the event in question (e.g. the successful concert) matters to them, or that their 
respective emotions disclose the fact that the event has an affective value for the 
group that they are part of (the orchestra) and that they, in turn, care about. Con-
sider that in such cases we do not have an instance of a properly speaking “shared 
emotion” (since, recall, emotions are individuated by their focus) (p. 121); yet, we 
still have an episode of CAI.
With the conception of a group that one “cares” about, we arrive at the second 
core issue mentioned above, namely of how to conceive of groups instantiating 
CAI. Here, the studies’ well-taken metaphysically deflationary move as well as its 
existential credentials come into play. Thus, Sánchez Guerrero’s rightly argues 
that we do not need to solve any “particular metaphysical problem” regarding the 
question of a particular supra-individual entity, to which the relevant affective 
experiences would be attributed. In other words, we can have proper instances 
of CAI without assuming a group conceived of as the proper bearer or subject of 
those instances (cf. p. 113, 118f.), to wit, without succumbing to an individualistic 
or summative view. But even more interestingly and probably more contentiously, 
Sánchez Guerrero proposes an intricate, existential bedrock for the constitution 
of the right sort of groups. This Heideggerian move in the argument of the book 
comes to the fore only by going beyond the thematic focus on affective sharing 
as such, namely by looking at the existential-ontological fact that humans are 
capable of engaging in affective intentional communities in the first place, 
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however transient or robust these communities might be. Thus, the author argues 
that the very possibility of affective togetherness discloses not just something 
about our emotional abilities, and specifically about our ability to feel together, 
but a more general “essential character of our human nature,” namely that “we 
are beings that can (and often do) exist as some particular group we (together with 
certain others) constitute” (p. 201).
This idea is cashed out in terms of Heidegger’s notions of Dasein’s being-
with (Mitsein) and being-with-one-another (Miteinandersein) in a common and 
“essentially shareable world,” and Matthew Ratcliffe’s Heidegger-inspired notion 
of “pre-intentional, existential feelings” (Chapter 6). The claim is that our exis-
tential feeling of “being-together-in-the-same-world” enables us to “situation-
specific” instances of CAI (p. 168). In a further step, based on a reconstruction 
of Heidegger’s notion of care (Sorge) as a specific form of “caring together about 
something” (Chapters 6, 7), Sánchez Guerrero argues that in CAI participants take 
themselves “immediately” and “experientially” to constitute a group “for-the-
sake-of-which” and “on behalf of which” they care for when they individually 
and often qualitatively differently emotionally respond to a particular event or 
object (p. 173). Pace Heidegger, what we care about in such instances is not our 
own existence but the “well-being” and “flourishing” of our group (cf. p. 181, 224, 
260).
On the face of it, this seems not right. After all, why should every instance of 
affective sharing involve caring for the flourishing of the respective affective com-
munity, especially in cases when this community, as Sánchez Guerrero readily 
acknowledges, may just last for an hour or so (cf. Chapter 8.3). Why should I, say, 
care for the flourishing of the randomly met group of hikers, even if I care together 
with the other hikers for the group’s safety in the face of a snowstorm? Elabo-
rating on the Heideggerian notion of “existential possibilities” (Chapter  8.3), 
Sánchez Guerrero argues that the reason is that if I respond “in an authenti-
cally affective and genuinely joint manner” to the event at issue I “immediately” 
(pre-intentionally) affectively understand my own existentially possibility as a 
“shared possibility,” or as the group’s own possibility (p. 260). No matter how 
temporary the group with whom I have a concern-based “sense-of-togetherness” 
is (Chapter 6), if I authentically share its concerns, I have a sense that I am that 
group. It is this sense of togetherness that “ultimately permits [us] to emotionally 
respond to certain occurrences in a genuinely joint manner” (ibid.).
But with these notions of authenticity and sense of togetherness and with 
the issue of the robustness of the affective intentional communities we arrive at 
the crucial challenges and some desiderata of the book. To begin with, consider 
the notion of authenticity and its connection to the somewhat underexplored 
issue of the normativity of collective emotions, their being subject to norms of 
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appropriateness and justification. To be sure, the book does engage with the issue 
of normativity in the individual case sufficiently (Chapters 2, 5) and also offers 
thorough critical and yet sympathetic analyses of Gilbert’s joint commitment 
view of collective emotions throughout the book (Chapters 3, 4, 8.2). However, 
and even though it explicitly aims to accommodate not just the affective-cum-
intentional but also the normative nature of CAI, some more argument to under-
stand potential disruptions of feeling together (for a brief discussion see p. 171) or 
the normative unwarrantedness of instances of CAI would have been advisable, 
both with regard to their intentional targets and the “normative character of the 
[affective; T.S.] ties between the individuals involved” (p. 98). What is normatively 
required of individuals’ evaluative responses to be part of their group’s response, 
and what is required of the shared evaluative response to be an appropriate and 
an appropriately shared evaluative response to the particular worldly object or 
event? As none of these requirements are sufficiently explained by reference to 
Gilbert-style joint commitments to feel as one, what is it then: authenticity of 
(individual and collective) emotions, or the endorsement of one’s own existential 
possibilities as that of the group? Here, some readers might have welcomed more 
in-depth discussions of the nature and role of norms of feeling together and in 
particular in relation to the notion of authenticity (cf., on this, also Fn. 2, p. 202).
In this connection, one might have also wished for more discussion of 
whether and how the diachronic or institutionalized robustness of affective 
communities might modulate the engagement in particular episodes of CAI. For 
example, it seems plausible that habitualization of shared evaluative responses 
often sediments itself (e.g. in rituals) in a way that even if there is no immediate 
care for the flourishing or any direct joint commitment at play those habitual-
ized shared evaluative responses might still exert strong affective and normative 
powers and result in a strong feeling of obligation for the maintenance of the 
shared perspective.
Finally, and again relatedly, though the author repeatedly addresses the noto-
rious problem of circularity regarding individuals’ “immediate” sense or feeling of 
togetherness, which is supposed to be constitutive for understanding themselves 
as members of an affective community, and their actualization in instances of feel-
ing-towards together (cf. 136f., 230ff., 242, 266), the author, in my view, cannot fully 
disperse the worry. The problem is not so much a methodological one but rather 
has to do with the fact that the author does not sufficiently clearly explains the dif-
ference between a “minimal feeling of being (a member of) a group” (Chapter 8.2), 
i.e. “the basic sense to the effect that one co-constitutes a particular group,” on the 
one hand, and the (more robust?) “sense that one’s emotional response is part of 
our emotional response – the sense that one is participating in an episode of col-
lective affective intentionality” (p. 231; cf. also p. 242f.), on the other hand.
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These critical remarks, however, should in no way deflect from the numerous 
merits of the book; it is absolutely essential and indeed highly rewarding reading 
for anybody, students and experts alike, interested in the intriguing debate on 
affective sharing.
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